The structure of reality and the structure of language

There is an irreducible distinction, an asymmetry, between the character/structure of reality and the character/structure of language. Reality is composed of unique things of which no two are the same. A central, very arguably the most central, logical structure of language is constituted by universals (‘red’,'blue’,’horse’). The implications of this difference are decisive and will form a large part of the content of the discussion of this blog. It is therefore necessary to outline the distinction at the beginning.
The unique character of everything which exists in reality was, of course, first expressed aphoristically, at least in Europe, in the phrase ascribed to Heraclitus ‘it is not possible to step into the same river twice’. Its classic formulation was Leibniz’s ‘identity of indiscernibles’.
In Leibniz’s formulation: ‘there are never two beings in nature that are perfectly alike.’[1] Or: ‘no two substances are completely similar.’ Therefore: ‘nowhere are there things perfectly similar.’ [2] And: ‘it is not true that two substances can resemble each other completely.’ [3]Therefore: ‘There is no such thing as two things indiscernible from each other... To suppose two things indiscernible is to suppose the same thing under two names.’[4]
Two abstract concepts may, therefore, be identical, but no two actually existing entities are identical. ‘two perfectly similar eggs, or two perfectly similar leaves or blades of grass will never be found. Perfect similarity, therefore, holds only in the case of incomplete and abstract notions, where things are not considered in all respects, but only with respect to a certain mode of consideration... in geometry two triangles are properly considered to be similar, although two material triangles which are perfectly alike are never found.’[5]
As Leibniz put it: ‘A consideration which is of the greatest importance in all philosophy... [is] that it is not possible for two things to differ from one another in respect of place and time alone, but that it is always necessary that there shall be some other internal difference. So there cannot be two atoms which are at the same time similar in shape and equal in magnitude to each other; for example, two equal cubes. Such notions are mathematical, that is, they are abstract and not real. For all things that are different must be distinguished in some way.’[6]
As universals do not have a real existence (pace Plato), there is no existing thing called ‘horse’ apart from all the actually existing horses, our senses therefore only give knowledge of specific things/entities. Or as Leibniz states it: ‘the senses never give us anything but instances.’[7]
For present purposes it is not necessary to investigate whether this observation is necessarily true, as Leibniz asserted, contingently true, or even universally true – that is whether extremely artificial and non-existent counter instances could be constructed.[8] It is merely sufficient to note that for all practical purposes no two things are identical – that is practice every actual entity which exists is unique.[9]
If we turn to language its logical structure is entirely different. A central core is constituted by universals – ‘red’,’ blue’, ‘horse’. That is, as noted at the beginning, the structure of reality and the structure of language necessarily logically differ. This is a not a matter of any particular philosophical theory of language but applies equally to any such theory as all must deal with the use of universals in language.[10] The implications of this will be considered in future entries.
[1] Leibniz, ‘The Monadology’ in G W Leibniz: Philosophical Essays Hackett, Indianapolis 1989 p214.
[2] Leibniz, ‘On Nature Itself’ in G W Leibniz: Philosophical Essays Hackett, Indianapolis 1989 p164.
[3] Leibniz, ‘Discourse on Metaphysics’ in G W Leibniz: Philosophical Essays Hackett, Indianapolis 1989 p41.
[4] Leibniz, ‘4th letter to Clarke’ in G W Leibniz and Samuel Clark: Correspondence, Hackett, Indianapolis 2000 p22.
[5] Leibniz, ‘On Primary Truths’ in Leibniz, Philosophical Writings, Dent, London 1973p89.
[6] Leibniz, ‘On the Principle of Indiscernibles’ in Leibniz, Philosophical Writings, Dent, London 1973p133.
[7] Leibniz, ‘Preface to the New Essays’ in G W Leibniz: Philosophical Essays Hackett, Indianapolis 1989 p41.
[8] The most frequent one is to try to imagine two spheres in a symmetrical universe, or that the universe consists entirely of two matching pairs of gloves – unfortunately however the universe is not symmetrical, nor does it consist purely of two matching pairs of gloves, so even if true, which is doubtful, such arguments are of no practical relevance.
[9] Wittgenstein famously observed: ‘Roughly speaking, to say of two things that they are identical is nonsense, and to say of one thing that it is identical with itself is to say nothing at all.’ Tractaus Logico-Philosophicus 5.5303 http://www.kfs.org/~jonathan/witt/t5530en.html
[10] It therefore applies equally, among other things, to what is strangely termed in the UK ’continental philosophy’ or to the various Anglo-Saxon schools of ‘analytic philosophy’.